Member, Rotman Institute of Philosophy
Philosophy of Neuroscience, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Mind
BA Clark University; MS, PhD University of Pittsburgh
My research is situated at the intersection of philosophy of neuroscience, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science and has its origin in a single basic question: What light does contemporary neuroscience shed on the relationship between mind and brain? My approach to this question is unique insofar as I contend that answering it requires directing analytical scrutiny at the investigative strategies neuroscientists use to probe this relationship. To this end, the project at the heart of my research program is to develop and refine a conceptual framework for analyzing experiments and experimental practice in the neurosciences of cognition.
I am happy to supervise projects in
“Classification, Kinds, Taxonomic Stability, and Conceptual Change” (with J. Mattu). In Aggression and Violent Behavior(2020).
"Understanding Crime: A Mutilevel Approach" (with D. Ward). In Psychology, Crime & Law, 25(6): 709-711 (2020).
"Achieving Cumulative Progress in Understanding Crime: Some Insights from the Philosophy of Science". In Psychology, Crime & Law, 25(6): 561-576 (2019).
"Optogenetics, Pluralism and Progress". In Philosophy of Science 85 (00):1090-1101 (2018).
"Judging Mechanistic Neuroscience: A preliminary conceptual-analytic framework for evaluating scientific evidence in the courtroom" (with E. Baron). In Psychology, Crime and Law 24(3): 334-351 (2018).
"Coordinated Pluralism as a Means to Facilitate Integrative Taxonomies of Cognition". In Philosophical Explorations Issue 2: 129-145 (2017).
"Construct Stabilization and the Unity of the Mind-Brain Sciences". In Philosophy of Science 83: 662-673 (2016).
"Response to Commentary on Stabilizing constructs through collaboration across different research fields as a way to foster the integrative approach of the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Project". In Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (2016).
"Stabilizing constructs through collaboration across different research fields as a way to foster the integrative approach of the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Project". In Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (2016).
"Mechanisms in neuroscience", (with C. Stinson). Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Mechanisms, Stuart Glennan and Phyllis Illari (eds.). Routledge (2017).
“Long-term potentiation: One Kind or Many?”. In Eppur Si Muove: Doing History and Philosophy of Science: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Peter Machamer. Marcus Adams, Zvi Biener, Uljana Feest and Jackie Sullivan, eds., Springer. pp. 127-140 (2016).
“Models of Mental Illness”. In Harold Kincaid, Jeremy Simon & Miriam Solomon (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Medicine. Routledge. pp. 455-464 (2016).
“Neuroscientific Kinds Through the Lens of Scientific Practice”. In Catherine Kendig (ed.), Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice. Routledge. pp. 47-56 (2016).
Journal Book Forum Contribution
Are there Model Behaviours for Model Organism Research? Commentary on Nicole Nelson's Model Behavior. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences82:101266 (2020).