Angela Mendelovici


Associate Professor
Graduate Program Chair
Member, Rotman Institute of Philosophy

Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Science
BA McGill; PhD Princeton

Phone: 519-661-2111 ext. 81583
Office: Stevenson Hall 3144

My research is on intentionality, consciousness, and the relationship between the two. Much of my work argues for the view that intentionality is grounded in phenomenal consciousness.

I am happy to supervise and advise graduate students working in contemporary philosophy of mind, especially those working on intentionality.

Recent Publications


The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality. New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 2018.


"Consciousness and Intentionality," (with D. Bourget). In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585 (2020).

"How Reliably Misrepresenting Olfactory Experiences Justify True Beliefs". In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Gatzia (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 99-117 (2020).

"Panpsychism’s Combination Problem Is a Problem for Everyone". In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. London, UK: Routledge (2019).

"Immediate and Reflective Senses". In Dena Shottenkirk, Manuel Curado & Steven Gouveia (eds.), Perception, Cognition, and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge. pp. 187-209 (2019).

"Propositionalism without propositions, objectualism without objects". In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, UK: Oxford, UK. pp. 214-233 (2018).


“Review of Laura Candiotto’s The Value of Emotions for Knowledge,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 1.

"Reply to Philip Woodward’s review of The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality". In Philosophical Psychology 32 (8), 2019:1261-1267.

"Phenomenal Intentionality," (with D. Bourget). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016).

"Why tracking theories should allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation". In Disputatio 8 (42), 2016:57-92.

Mendelovici, A. Propositionalism without propositions, objectualism without objects. In Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague (eds.). Non-propositional Intentionality. Oxford University Press. (forthcoming)

Bourget, D. and Mendelovici, A. Phenomenal intentionality. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (2016)

Why tracking theories should allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation. Disputatio. 8 (42):57–92. (2016)