Angela Mendelovici

angela

Associate Professor
Member, Rotman Institute of Philosophy

Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Science
BA McGill; PhD Princeton

Phone: 519-661-2111 ext. 81583
Office: Stevenson Hall, Room 4135
E-mail: amendel5@uwo.ca  
Website: publish.uwo.ca/~amendel5

My research is on intentionality, consciousness, and the relationship between the two. Much of my work argues for the view that intentionality is grounded in phenomenal consciousness.

I am happy to supervise and advise graduate students working in contemporary philosophy of mind, especially those working on intentionality.

Recent Publications

Book

The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality. New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Chapters

"Consciousness and Intentionality," (with D. Bourget). In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585 (2020).

"How Reliably Misrepresenting Olfactory Experiences Justify True Beliefs". In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Gatzia (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 99-117 (2020).

"Panpsychism’s Combination Problem Is a Problem for Everyone". In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. London, UK: Routledge (2019).

"Immediate and Reflective Senses". In Dena Shottenkirk, Manuel Curado & Steven Gouveia (eds.), Perception, Cognition, and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge. pp. 187-209 (2019).

"Propositionalism without propositions, objectualism without objects". In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, UK: Oxford, UK. pp. 214-233 (2018).

Articles

"Reply to Philip Woodward’s review of The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality". In Philosophical Psychology 32 (8), 2019:1261-1267.

"Phenomenal Intentionality," (with D. Bourget). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016).

"Why tracking theories should allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation". In Disputatio 8 (42), 2016:57-92.



Mendelovici, A. Propositionalism without propositions, objectualism without objects. In Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague (eds.). Non-propositional Intentionality. Oxford University Press. (forthcoming)

Bourget, D. and Mendelovici, A. Phenomenal intentionality. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (2016)

Why tracking theories should allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation. Disputatio. 8 (42):57–92. (2016)