Observational Type Theory

meets

The Calculus of Inductive Constructions

Observational Type Theory

OTT is an extension of Martin-Löf Type Theory

It swaps the inductive equality of MLTT for the observational equality: a propositional equality defined on a type by type basis

A : Typet, u : At
$$\sim_A$$
 u : Prop

This equality recovers extensionality principles for MLTT (function extensionality, proposition extensionality...) without sacrificing computational properties.

Altenkirch, McBride, Swierstra '07. Observational Equality, Now!

Calculus of Inductive Constructions

CIC is the type theory behind Coq and Lean On top of Martin-Löf Type Theory, it adds

- A comprehensive class of indexed inductive types
- Two impredicative universes of propositions

 $\frac{\Gamma \vdash A : Type}{\Gamma \vdash \Pi (x : A) \cdot B : Prop}$

Prop is proof-relevant SProp is proof-irrelevant

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for 1-toposes

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Thus we need to make sure that OTT plays nicely with the features of the Coq proof assistant

A programme unfolded in several steps:

TT ^{obs} : MLTT with SProp and an observational equality CC ^{obs} : Adds support for an impredicative SProp CIC ^{obs} : Adds support for cast-on-reflexivity, adds support for general inductive types

We equip every type with a propositional relation $\,\sim\,$

A : Typet, u : AA : Typet : At
$$\sim_A$$
 u : SProprefl(t) : t \sim_A t

This is a strict proposition \rightarrow any two proofs of equality are convertible

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A: Typet, u : AA: Typet : A
$$t \sim_A u : SProp$$
refl(t) : t $\sim_A t$

This is a strict proposition \rightarrow any two proofs of equality are convertible

Since strict propositions contains no computational information, we can postulate all the axioms we want — they won't block computation!

funext : (
$$\Pi$$
 (x : A) . f x ~_B g x) \rightarrow f ~_{A \rightarrow B} g
propext : (P \rightarrow Q) \times (Q \rightarrow P) \rightarrow P ~_{SProp} Q
transp : Π (P : A \rightarrow SProp) (t : A) (x : P t) (u : A) (e : t ~_A u) . P u

Dependent funext and transp are enough to characterize the equality on inductive types and dependent products.

We also need to define the observational equality for the universe. Since it cannot be univalent, we ask for the injectivity of type constructors:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_1^{\varepsilon} &: (A \to B) \sim_{\text{Type}} (A' \to B') \to A' \sim_{\text{Type}} A \\ \pi_2^{\varepsilon} &: (A \to B) \sim_{\text{Type}} (A' \to B') \to B \sim_{\text{Type}} B' \\ \text{antidiag} &: A \sim_{\text{Type}} B \to \bot & \text{if A and B have different head constructors} \\ \text{etc.} \end{aligned}$$

Since the observational equality contains no computational info, how do we eliminate it?

Since the observational equality contains no computational info, how do we eliminate it? We add a primitive cast operator!

$$\frac{A, B: Type \quad e: A \sim_{Type} B \quad t: A}{cast(A, B, e, t): B}$$

 $\frac{A: Type \qquad t: A}{cast(A,A,refl(A),t) \equiv t}$

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$$\sim_{Type}$$
 Bt : Acast(A,B,e,t) : BA : Typet : Acast(A,A,refl(A),t) : Bcast(A,A,refl(A),t) = t

The cast operator computes according to the head constructors of A and B

cast(A \rightarrow B, A' \rightarrow B', e, f) $\equiv \lambda(x : A')$. cast(B, B', π_1^{ϵ} e, cast(A', A, π_2^{ϵ} e, x)) cast(A \rightarrow B, \mathbb{N} , e, f) \equiv exfalso(\mathbb{N} , antidiag(e))

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With the cast, we can derive the J eliminator for Type-valued predicates:

: A P:
$$\Box$$
 (x: A). t \sim_A x \rightarrow Type u: A e: t \sim_A u a: Pt

cast(P t refl(t), P u e, ap P e, e), a) : P y e

First observation : we need to add new normal forms

Inductive eq (A : Type) (a : A) : A \rightarrow Type := | eq_refl : eq A a a

Using the induction principle for eq, we can show that

eq A t u \longleftrightarrow t \sim_{A} u

Thus function extensionality is provable for eq, which implies that not every closed proof of eq reduces to eq_refl

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We can recover canonicity by translating indices to parameters

Second observation : equality between inductive types should not imply equality of the indices. Consider the following type:

Inductive Empty (A : Type) : Type := \emptyset

If Empty A \sim_{Type} Empty B implies A \sim_{Type} B, then we have a retract of Type inside Type, which is inconsistent

Instead, we use the equality of the constructor arguments

Inductive vect (A : Type) : $\mathbb{N} \to \text{Type} :=$ | vnil : vect A 0 | vcons : Π (m : \mathbb{N}). A \to vect A m \to vect A (S m)

Inductive vect (A : Type) (n : \mathbb{N}) : Type := | vnil : n $\sim_{\mathbb{N}} 0 \rightarrow$ vect A n | vcons : Π (m : \mathbb{N}) . A \rightarrow vect A m \rightarrow n $\sim_{\mathbb{N}}$ S m \rightarrow vect A n

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from e : vect A n \sim_{Type} vect A' n', we obtain vnil $_{1}^{\varepsilon}$: (n $\sim_{\mathbb{N}}$ 0) \sim_{SProp} (n' $\sim_{\mathbb{N}}$ 0) vcons $_{1}^{\varepsilon}$: A \sim_{Type} A' vcons $_{2}^{\varepsilon}$: Π (m : \mathbb{N}) . vect A m \sim_{Type} vect A' m vcons $_{3}^{\varepsilon}$: Π (m : \mathbb{N}) . (n $\sim_{\mathbb{N}}$ S m) \sim_{SProp} (n' $\sim_{\mathbb{N}}$ S m)

Impredicativity

Our sort of strict propositions is impredicative, and supports large elimination for the observational equality

Thus we need to be careful in our implementation: the algorithm used by Lean in a similar setting is non-terminating.

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 $\begin{array}{l} \bot := \Pi \ (X : SProp) \ . \ X \\ \delta := \lambda \ (x : \bot) \ . \ x \ (\bot \rightarrow \bot) \ x \\ \Omega := \delta \ (\lambda X. \ cast(\bot \rightarrow \bot, \ X) \ \delta) \end{array}$

 $\Omega \rightsquigarrow \Omega \rightsquigarrow \Omega \rightsquigarrow \dots$

Abel, Coquand '19. Failure of Normalization in Impredicative Type Theory with Proof-Irrelevant Propositional Equality 11

Impredicativity

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Thus we need to be careful in our implementation: the algorithm used by Lean in a similar setting is non-terminating.

However, this is not a problem if we don't reduce irrelevant proofs

Abel, Coquand '19. Failure of Normalization in Impredicative Type Theory with Proof–Irrelevant Propositional Equality 11

Theorem : CIC^{obs} has a model in any Grothendieck 1-topos, where the interpretation of the universe hierarchy contains codes for every object of the topos.

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Proof sketch : given a hierarchy of strict universes $U_0 < U_1 < U_2$... for the topos, we use small induction to build a new hierarchy of universes of codes

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\begin{array}{l} V_{i}: U_{i} \rightarrow U_{i+1} := \\ | \mbox{ embed} : \ \ (X : U_{i}) \ . \ V_{i} \ X \\ | \mbox{ code} \ \ \ \ (X : U_{i}) \ (X_{\epsilon} : V_{i} \ X) \ (Y : X \rightarrow U_{i}) \ (Y_{\epsilon} : (x : X) \rightarrow V_{i} \ (Y \ x)) \ . \ V_{i} \ (\Pi \ X \ Y) \\ | \ \dots \end{array}
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Is CIC^{obs} a reasonable language for 1-toposes?

- It is much more powerful than the theory of elementary toposes: we get not only a natural number object, but also some limited amount of replacement (enough to define $\mathbb{N} + P(\mathbb{N}) + P(P(\mathbb{N})) + ...)$

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- It is much more powerful than the theory of elementary toposes: we get not only a natural number object, but also some limited amount of replacement (enough to define $\mathbb{N} + P(\mathbb{N}) + P(P(\mathbb{N})) + ...)$

- And yet, we don't get the principle of unique choice: $(R : A \rightarrow B \rightarrow SProp) \times (\Pi (a : A) . \exists ! (b : B) . R a b)$ $\rightarrow \Sigma (f : A \rightarrow B) . (\Pi (a : A) . R a (f a))$

Normalization Models

Theorem : every well-typed term of CIC^{obs} is normalizing. Corollary : the typing relation for CIC^{obs} is decidable.

Proof sketch : we build a normalization model in MLTT (formalized in Agda), using Abel et al.'s framework. The cast operator is fundamentally non-parametric, which implies that we need a proof-irrelevant reducibility predicate. Unsurprisingly, this prevents us from supporting Prop in our model. But with a simple trick, we can have SProp!

Normalization Models

Corollary : every integer function that can be defined as a closed term of type $\mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ in CIC^{obs} can also be defined in bare MLTT. This is connected to the lack of unique choice: even though we can use impredicativity to show that there exist functional relations that cannot be defined in MLTT, we cannot extract them to terms of type $\mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$

Normalization Models

Corollary : every integer function that can be defined as a closed term of type $\mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ in MLTT+Univalence can also be defined in bare MLTT.

Proof sketch : we can use the cubical model of Cohen et al. to embed MLTT+Univalence in CIC^{obs}