

Title: Language Instrumentalism and Philosophy of Language: A look at the limits of Linguistic research in Interfaces

Language research has always been bounded to the theories of linguistics believed to account theoretically, and in a normative path, for usual and unusual cases because they have a similar modal in the linguistic theory. However, the language research is not all normative and covered by the linguistic theories. There are interfaces that do not need the linguistic modal per se but other modals having more power to account for paradoxical cases. Those cases wherein language research does not occur in the language itself but as an interface resulting from the relation between language and other different fields such as literature may need more than the restrictions of formalism. Meaning, for instance, is not all about explaining words in their structural arrangement or in their truth-conditionality as semantic rules suggest.

Linguistics applies strictly and according to the principles of its theories whether being structural or functional. Meaning, for instance, does not go beyond the theories of semantics. Semantics does not yet possess the tool to explain abstract meaning such as the literary because the philosophy of semantics is limited to generalizable units and their laws. Strange type of meaning cannot be explained as it is a particularity that is not yet covered by the formalism of the semantic theory. This type of meaning occurs when language is instrumentalized and expresses more than what their units hold. Instead of linguistics, the philosophy of language can better account for such meaning as its tools are not restricted to a particular linguistic theory.

This paper aims to reveal the limits of the linguistic analysis in those fields of study that instrumentalise the language and where the latter is an interface in another field. The paper raises the efficiency of the philosophy of language as more powerful in accounting for language instrumentalism.